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Abstract
Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are “clients,” select a set
of at most k facility locations to minimize the average distance from the clients to their nearest facility.
This is just the well-studied k-median problem, for which many approximation algorithms and hardness
results are known. Note that the objective function encourages opening facilities in areas where there are
many clients, and given a solution, it is often possible to get a good idea of where the clients are located.
This raises the following quandary: what if the locations of the clients are sensitive information that we
would like to keep private? Is it even possible to design good algorithms for this problem that preserve
the privacy of the clients?
In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of algorithms for discrete optimization problems in the
framework of differential privacy (which formalizes the idea of protecting the privacy of individual input
elements). We show that many such problems indeed have good approximation algorithms that preserve
differential privacy; this is even in cases where it is impossible to preserve cryptographic definitions of
privacy while computing any non-trivial approximation to even the value of an optimal solution, let alone
the entire solution.
Apart from the k-median problem, we consider the problems of vertex and set cover, min-cut, facil-
ity location, and Steiner tree, and give approximation algorithms and lower bounds for these problems.
We also consider the recently introduced submodular maximization problem, “Combinatorial Public
Projects” (CPP), shown by Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] to be inapproximable to subpolynomial mul-
tiplicative factors by any efficient and truthful algorithm. We give a differentially private (and hence
approximately truthful) algorithm that achieves a logarithmic additive approximation.
1 Introduction
Consider the following problems:
• Assign people using a social network to one of two servers so that most pairs of friends are assigned to
the same server.
• Open some number of HIV treatment centers so that the average commute time for patients is small.
• Open a small number of drop-off centers for undercover agents so that each agent is able to visit some
site convenient to her (each providing a list of acceptable sites).
The above problems can be modeled as instances of well-known combinatorial optimization problems:
respectively the minimum cut problem, the k-median problem, and the set cover problem. Good heuristics
have been designed for these problems, and hence they may be considered well-studied and solved. However,
in the above scenarios and in many others, the input data (friendship relations, medical history, agents’
locations) represent sensitive information about individuals. Data privacy is a crucial design goal, and it
may be vastly preferable to use a private algorithm that gives somewhat suboptimal solutions to a non-
private optimal algorithm. This leads us to the following central questions: Given that the most benign of
actions possibly leaks sensitive information, how should we design algorithms for the above problems? What
are the fundamental trade-offs between the utility of these algorithms and the privacy guarantees they give
us?
The notion of privacy we consider in this paper is that of differential privacy. Informally, differential
privacy guarantees that the distribution of outcomes of the computation does not change significantly when
one individual changes her input data. This is a very strong privacy guarantee: anything significant about
any individual that an adversary could learn from the algorithm’s output, he could also learn were the
individual not participating in the database at all—and this holds true no matter what auxiliary information
the adversary may have. This definition guarantees privacy of an individual’s sensitive data, while allowing
the computation to respond when a large number of individuals change their data, as any useful computation
must do.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we initiate a systematic study of designing algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems
under the constraint of differential privacy. Here is a short summary of some of the main contributions of
our work.
• While the exponential mechanism of [MT07] is an easy way to obtain computationally inefficient private
approximation algorithms for some problems, the approximation guarantees given by a direct applica-
tion of this can be far from optimal (e.g., see our results on min-cut and weighted set cover). In these
cases, we have to use different techniques—often more sophisticated applications of the exponential
mechanism—to get good (albeit computationally expensive) solutions.
• However, we want our algorithms to be computationally efficient and private at the same time: here
we cannot use the exponential mechanism directly, and hence we develop new algorithmic ideas. We
give private algorithms for a wide variety of search problems, where we must not only approximate the
value of the solution, but also produce a solution that optimizes this value. See Table 1 for our results.
• For some problems, unfortunately, just outputting an explicit solution might leak private information.
For example, if we output a vertex cover of some graph explicitly, any pair of vertices not output
reveals that they do not share an edge —so any private explicit vertex cover algorithm must output
n − 1 vertices. To overcome this hurdle, we instead privately output an implicit representation of a
small vertex cover— we view vertex cover as a location problem, and output an orientation of the
edges. Each edge can cover itself using the end point that it points to. The orientation is output
privately, and the resulting vertex cover approximates the optimal vertex cover well. We deal with
similar representational issues for other problems like set cover as well.
• We also show lower bounds on the approximation guarantees regardless of computational considera-
tions. For example, for vertex cover, we show that any ǫ-differentially private algorithm must have
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Non-private Efficient Algorithms Information Theoretic
Vertex Cover 2× OPT [Pit85] (2 + 16/ǫ)× OPT Θ(1/ǫ)× OPT
Wtd. Vertex Cover 2× OPT [Hoc82] (16 + 16/ǫ)× OPT Θ(1/ǫ)× OPT
Set Cover lnn× OPT [Joh74] O(lnn+ lnm/ǫ)× OPT † Θ(lnm/ǫ)× OPT
Wtd. Set Cover lnn× OPT [Chv79] O(lnn(lnm+ ln lnn)/ǫ)× OPT † Θ(lnm/ǫ)× OPT
Min Cut OPT [FF56] OPT+O(lnn/ǫ) † OPT+Θ(lnn/ǫ)
CPPP (1− 1/e)× OPT [NWF78] (1 − 1/e)× OPT−O(k lnm/ǫ) † OPT−Θ(k ln(m/k)/ǫ)
k-Median (3 + γ)× OPT [AGK+04] 6× OPT+O(k2 ln2 n/ǫ) OPT+Θ(k ln(n/k)/ǫ)a
Table 1: Summary of Results. Results in the second and third columns are from this paper.
a[FFKN09] independently prove a similar lower bound.
an approximation guarantee of Ω(1/ǫ). We show that each of our lower bounds are tight: we give
(computationally inefficient) algorithms with matching approximation guarantees.
• Our results have implications beyond privacy as well: Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] introduce the
Combinatorial Public Project problem, a special case of submodular maximization, and show that the
problem can be well approximated by either a truthful mechanism or an efficient algorithm, but not by
both simultaneously. In contrast to this negative result, we show that under differential privacy (which
can be interpreted as an approximate but robust alternative to truthfulness) we can achieve the same
approximation factor as the best non-truthful algorithm, plus an additive logarithmic loss.
• Finally, we develop a private amplification lemma: we show how to take private algorithms that gives
bounds in expectation and efficiently convert them (privately) into bounds with high probability. This
answers an open question in the paper of Feldman et al. [FFKN09].
Table 1 summarizes the bounds we prove in this paper. For each problem, it reports (in the first
column) the best known non-private approximation guarantees, (in the second column) our best efficient
ǫ-differentially private algorithms, and in each (in the third column) case matching upper and lower bounds
for inefficient ǫ-differentially private algorithms. For a few of the efficient algorithms (marked with a †) the
guarantees are only for an approximate form of differential privacy, incorporating a failure probability δ, and
scaling the effective value of ǫ up by ln(1/δ).
1.2 Related Work
Differential privacy is a relatively recent privacy definition (e.g., see [DMNS06, Dwo06, NRS07, BLR08,
KLN+08, FFKN09, DNR+09], and see [Dwo08] for an excellent survey), that tries to capture the intuition of
individual privacy. Many algorithms in this framework have focused on measurement, statistics, and learning
tasks applied to statistical data sets, rather than on processing and producing combinatorial objects. One
exception to this is the Exponential Mechanism of [MT07] which allows the selection from a set of discrete
alternatives.
Independently, Feldman et al. [FFKN09] also consider the problem of privately approximating k-medians
for points in ℜd. Their model differs slightly from ours, which makes the results largely incomparable: while
our results for general metrics translated to ℜd give smaller additive errors than theirs, we only output a
k-median approximation whereas they output coresets for the problem. Their lower bound argument for
private coresets is similar to ours.
Prior work on Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) tells us that in fact the minimum cut in a graph can be
computed in a distributed fashion in such a way that computations reveals nothing that cannot be learnt from
the output of the computation. While this is a strong form of a privacy guarantee, it may be unsatisfying to
an individual whose private data can be inferred from the privately computed output. Indeed, it is not hard
to come up with instances where an attacker with some limited auxiliary information can infer the presence
or absence of specific edges from local information about the minimum cut in the graph. By relaxing the
whole input privacy requirement of SFE, differential privacy is able to provide unconditional per element
privacy, which SFE need not provide if the output itself discloses properties of input.
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Feigenbaum et al. [FIM+06] extend the notion of SFE to NP hard problems for which efficient algorithms
must output an approximation to the optimum, unless P=NP. They defined as functional privacy the con-
straint that two inputs with the same output value (e.g. the size of an optimal vertex cover) must produce
the same value under the approximation algorithm. Under this constraint, Halevi et al. [HKKN01] show
that approximating the value of vertex cover to within n1−ξ is as hard as computing the value itself, for any
constant ξ. These hardness results were extended to search problems by Beimel et al. [BCNW06], where the
constraint is relaxed to only equate those inputs whose sets of optimal solutions are identical. These results
were extended and strengthened by Beimel et al. [BHN07, BMNW07].
Nonetheless, Feigenbaum et al. [FIM+06] and others show a number of positive approximation results
under versions of the functional privacy model. Halevi et al. [HKKN01] provide positive results in the
function privacy setting when the algorithm is permitted to leak few bits (each equivalence class of input
need not produce identical output, but must be one of at most 2b possible outcomes). Indyk and Woodruff
also give some positive results for the approximation of ℓ2 distance and a nearest neighbor problem [IW06].
However, as functional privacy extends SFE, it does not protect sensitive data that can be inferred from the
output.
Nevertheless, SFE provides an implementation of any function in a distributed setting such that nothing
other than the output of the function is revealed. One can therefore run a differentially private algorithm is
a distributed manner using SFE (see e.g. [DKM+06, BNO08]), in the absence of a trusted curator.
2 Definitions
Differential privacy is a privacy definition for computations run against sensitive input data sets. Its require-
ment, informally, is that the computation behaves nearly identically on two input data sets that are nearly
identical; the probability of any outcome must not increase by more than a small constant factor when the
input set is altered by a single element. Formally,
Definition 1 ([DMNS06]). We say a randomized computation M has ǫ-differential privacy if for any two
input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)×Pr[M(B) ∈ S] . (2.1)
The definition has several appealing properties from a privacy perspective. One that is most important
for us is that arbitrary sequences of differentially private computations are also differentially private, with
an ǫ parameter equal to the sum of those comprising the sequence. This is true even when subsequent com-
putations can depend on and incorporate the results of prior differentially private computations [DKM+06],
allowing repetition of differentially private steps to improve solutions.
2.1 Approximate Differential Privacy
One relaxation of differential privacy [DKM+06] allows a small additive term in the bound:
Definition 2. We say a randomized computation M has δ-approximate ǫ-differential privacy if for any two
input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ)×Pr[M(B) ∈ S] + δ . (2.2)
The flavor of guarantee is that although not all events have their probabilities preserved, the alteration
is only for very low probability events, and is very unlikely to happen. The δ is best thought of as 1/poly(n)
for a data set containing some subset of n candidate records. We note that there are stronger notions
of approximate differential privacy (c.f. [MKA+08]), but in our settings, they are equivalent upto poly(n)
changes in δ. We therefore restrict ourselves to this definition here.
2.2 The Exponential Mechanism
One particularly general tool that we will often use is the exponential mechanism of [MT07]. This construc-
tion allows differentially private computation over arbitrary domains and ranges, parametrized by a query
function q(A, r) mapping a pair of input data set A (a multiset over some domain) and candidate result r to
a real valued “score”. With q and a target privacy value ǫ, the mechanism selects an output with exponential
bias in favor of high scoring outputs:
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Pr[Eǫq(A) = r] ∝ exp(ǫq(A, r)) . (2.3)
If the query function q has the property that any two adjacent data sets have score within ∆ of each other,
for all possible outputs r, the mechanism provides 2ǫ∆-differential privacy. Typically, we would normalize q
so that ∆ = 1. We will be using this mechanism almost exclusively over discrete ranges, where we can derive
the following simple analogue of a theorem of [MT07], that the probability of a highly suboptimal output is
exponentially low:
Theorem 2.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to select an output r ∈ R gives 2ǫ∆-differential
privacy, letting ROPT be the subset of R achieving q(A, r) = maxr q(A, r), ensures that
Pr[q(A, Eǫq(A)) < maxr q(A, r) − ln(|R|/|ROPT|)/ǫ− t/ǫ] ≤ exp(−t) . (2.4)
The proof of the theorem is almost immediate: any outcome with score less than maxr q(A, r) −
ln(|R|/|ROPT|)/ǫ − t/ǫ will have normalized probability at most exp(−t)/|R|; each has weight at most
exp(OPT − t)|ROPT|/|R|, but is normalized by at least |ROPT| exp(OPT) from the optimal outputs. As
there are at most |R| such outputs their cumulative probability is at most exp(−t).
3 Private Min-Cut
Given a graph G = (V,E) the minimum cut problem is to find a cut (S, Sc) so as to minimize E(S, Sc).
In absence of privacy constraints, this problem is efficiently solvable exactly. However, outputting an exact
solution violates privacy, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus, we give an algorithm to output a cut within
additive O(log n/ǫ) edges of optimal.
The algorithm has two stages: First, given a graph G, we add edges to the graph to raise the cost
of the min cut to at least 4 lnn/ǫ, in a differentially private manner. Second, we deploy the exponential
mechanism over all cuts in the graph, using a theorem of Karger to show that for graphs with min cut
at least 4 lnn/ǫ the number of cuts within additive t of OPT increases no faster than exponentially with
t. Although the exponential mechanism takes time exponential in n, we can construct a polynomial time
version by considering only the polynomially many cuts within O(lnn/ǫ) of OPT. Below, let Cost(H, (S, Sc))
denote the size EH(S, S
c) of the cut (S, Sc) in a graph H .
Algorithm 1 The Min-Cut Algorithm
1: Input: G = (V,E),ǫ.
2: Let H0 ⊂ H1, . . . ,⊂ H(n2) be arbitrary strictly increasing sets of edges on V .
3: Choose index i ∈ [0, (n2)] with probability proportional to exp(−ǫ|OPT(G ∪Hi)− 8 lnn/ǫ|).
4: Choose a subset S ∈ 2V \ {∅, V } with probability proportional to exp(−ǫCost(G ∪Hi, (S, Sc))).
5: Output the cut C = (S, Sc).
Our result relies on a result of Karger about the number of near-minimum cuts in a graph [Kar93]
Lemma 3.1 ([Kar93]). For any graph G with min cut C, there are at most n2α cuts of size at most αC.
By enlarging the size of the min cut in G ∪Hi to at least 4 lnn/ǫ, we ensure that the number of cuts of
value OPT(G ∪Hi) + t is bounded by n2 exp(ǫt/2). The downweighting of the exponential mechanism will
be able to counteract this growth in number and ensure that we select a good cut.
Theorem 3.2. For any graph G, the expected cost of ALG is at most OPT+O(lnn/ǫ).
Proof. First, we argue that the selected index i satisfies 4 lnn/ǫ < OPT(G∪Hi) < OPT(G) + 12 lnn/ǫ with
probability at least 1− 1/n2. For OPT > 8 lnn/ǫ, Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability of exceeding the
optimal choice (H0) by 4 lnn/ǫ is at most 1− 1/n2. Likewise, for OPT < 8 lnn/ǫ, there is some optimal Hi
achieving min cut size 8 lnn/ǫ, and the probability we end up farther away than 4 lnn/ǫ is at most 1− 1/n2.
Assuming now that OPT(G∪Hi) > 4 lnn/ǫ, Karger’s lemma argues that the number ct of cuts in G∪Hi
of cost at most OPT(G∪Hi)+ t is at most n2 exp(ǫt/2). As we are assured a cut of size OPT(G∪Hi) exists,
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each cut of size OPT(G ∪Hi) + t will receive probability at most exp(−ǫt). Put together, the probability of
a cut exceeding OPT(G ∪Hi) + b is at most
Pr[Cost(G ∪Hi, C) > OPT(G ∪Hi) + b] ≤
∑
t>b
exp(−ǫt)(ct − ct−1) (3.5)
≤ (exp(ǫ)− 1)
∑
t>b
exp(−ǫt)ct (3.6)
≤ (exp(ǫ)− 1)
∑
t>b
exp(−ǫt/2)n2 (3.7)
The sum telescopes to exp(−ǫb/2)n2/(exp(ǫ/2)− 1), and the denominator is within a constant factor of the
leading factor of (exp(ǫ)− 1), for ǫ < 1. For b = 8 lnn/ǫ, this probability becomes at most 1/n2.
Theorem 3.3. The algorithm above preserves 2ǫ-differential privacy.
Note that the first instance of the exponential mechanism in our algorithm runs efficiently (since it
is selecting from only
(
n
2
)
objects), but the second instance does not. We now describe how to achieve
(ε, δ)-differential privacy efficiently.
First recall that using Karger’s algorithm we can efficiently (with high probability) generate all cuts of
size at most kOPT for any constant k. Indeed it is shown in [Kar93] that in a single run of his algorithm,
any such cut is output with probability at least n−2k so that n2k+1 runs of the algorithm will output all such
cuts except with an exponentially small probability.
Our efficient algorithm works as follows: in step 4 of Algorithm 1, instead of sampling amongst all possible
cuts, we restrict attention to the set of cuts generated in n7 runs of Karger’s algorithm. We claim that the
output distribution of this algorithm has statistical distance O(1/n2) from that of Algorithm 1, which would
imply that we get (ε,O( 1n2 ))-differential privacy.
Consider a hypothetical algorithm that generates the cut (S, Sc) as in Algorithm 1 but then outputs
FAIL whenever this cut is not in the set of cuts generated by n7 runs of Karger’s. We first show that the
probability that this algorithm outputs FAIL is O( 1n2 ). As shown above, OPT(G ∪ Hi) is at least 4 lnn/ε
except with probability 1n2 . Conditioned on this, the cut chosen in Step 4 has cost at most 3OPT(G ∪Hi)
except with probability 1n2 . Since each such cut is in the sample except with exponentially small probability,
the claim follows. Finally, note that this hypothetical algorithm can be naturally coupled with both the
algorithms so that the outputs agree whenever the former doesn’t output FAIL. This implies the claimed
bound on the statistical distance. We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the running time here;
both the running time and the value of δ can be improved by choosing a larger constant (instead of 8) in
Step 3, at the cost of increasing the additive error by an additional constant.
3.1 Lower Bounds
We next show that this additive error is unavoidable for any differentially private algorithm. The lower
bound is information-theoretic and thus applies also to computationally inefficient algorithms.
Theorem 3.4. Any ǫ-differentially private algorithm for min-cut must incur an expected additive Ω(lnn/ǫ)
cost over OPT, for any ǫ ∈ (3 lnn/n, 112 ).
Proof. Consider a lnn/3ǫ-regular graph G = (V,E) on n vertices such that the minimum cuts are exactly
those that isolate a single vertex, and any other cut has size at least (lnn/2ǫ) (a simple probabilistic argument
establishes the existence of such a G; in fact a randomly chosen lnn/3ǫ-regular graph has this property with
high probability).
LetM be an ǫ-differentially private algorithm for the min-cut. Given the graph G, M outputs a partition
of V . Since there are n = |V | singleton cuts, there exists a vertex v such that the mechanism M run on G
outputs the cut ({v}, V \ {v}) with probability at most 1/n, i.e.
Pr[M(V,E) = ({v}, V \ {v}) ≤ 1
n
.
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Now consider the graph G′ = (V,E′), with the edges incident on v removed from G, i.e. E′ = E \ {e :
v ∈ e}. Since M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy and E and E′ differ in at most lnn/3ǫ edges,
Pr[M(V,E′) = ({v}, V \ {v})] ≤ 1/n1/3.
Thus with probability (1 − 1
n
1
3
), M(G′) outputs a cut other than the minimum cut ({v}, V \ {v}). But
all other cuts, even with these edges removed, cost at least (lnn/6ǫ). Since OPTis zero for G′, the claim
follows.
4 Private k-Median
We next consider a private version of the metric k-median problem: There is a pre-specified set of points
V and a metric on them, d : V × V → R. There is a (private) set of demand points D ⊆ V . We wish
to select a set of medians F ⊂ V with |F | = k to minimize the quantity cost(F ) = ∑v∈D d(v, F ) where
d(v, F ) = minf∈F d(v, f). Let ∆ = maxu,v∈V d(u, v) be the diameter of the space.
As we show in Section 4.1, any privacy-preserving algorithm for k-median must incur an additive loss of
Ω(∆ · k ln(n/k)/ǫ), regardless of computational constraints. We observe that running the exponential mech-
anism to choose one of the
(
n
k
)
subsets of medians gives an (computationally inefficient) additive guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. Using the exponential mechanism to pick a set of k facilities gives an O(
(
n
k
)
poly(n))-time
ǫ-differentially private algorithm that outputs a solution with expected cost OPT+O(k∆ log n/ǫ).
We next give a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a slightly worse approximation guarantee. Our
algorithm is based on the local search algorithm of Arya et al. [AGK+04]. We start with an arbitrary set of
k medians, and use the exponential mechanism to look for a (usually) improving swap. After running this
local search for a suitable number of steps, we select a good solution from amongst the ones seen during the
local search. The following result shows that if the current solution is far from optimal, then one can find
improving swaps.
Theorem 4.2 (Arya et al. [AGK+04]). For any set F ⊆ V with |F | = k, there exists a set of k swaps
(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) such that
∑k
i=1(cost(F )− cost(F − {xi}+ {yi})) ≥ cost(F )− 5OPT.
Corollary 4.3. For any set F ⊆ V with |F | = k, there exists some swap (x, y) such that
cost(F )− cost(F − {xi}+ {yi}) ≥ cost(F )− 5OPT
k
.
Algorithm 2 The k-Median Algorithm
1: Input: V , Demand points D ⊆ V , k,ǫ.
2: let F1 ⊂ V arbitrarily with |F1| = k, ǫ′ ← ǫ/(2∆(T + 1)).
3: for i = 1 to T do
4: Select (x, y) ∈ Fi × (V \ Fi) with probability proportional to exp(−ǫ′ × cost(Fi − {x}+ {y})).
5: let Fi+1 ← Fi − {x}+ {y}.
6: end for
7: Select j from {1, 2, . . . , T } with probability proportional to exp(−ǫ′ × cost(Fj)).
8: output Fj .
Theorem 4.4. Setting T = 6k lnn and ǫ′ = ǫ/(2∆(T + 1)), the k-median algorithm provides ǫ-differential
privacy and except with probability O(1/poly(n)) outputs a solution of cost at most 6OPT+O(∆k2 log2 n/ǫ).
Proof. We first prove the privacy. Since the cost function has sensitivity ∆, Step 4 of the algorithm preserves
2ǫ′∆ differential privacy. Since Step 4 is run at most T times and privacy composes additively, outputting
all of the T candidate solutions would give us (2ǫ′∆T ) differential privacy. Picking out a good solution from
the T candidates costs us another 2ǫ′∆, leading to the stated privacy guarantee.
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We next show the approximation guarantee. By Corollary 4.3, so long as cost(Fi) ≥ 6OPT, there exists a
swap (x, y) that reduces the cost by at least cost(Fi)/6k. As there are only n
2 possible swaps, the exponential
mechanism ensures through (2.4) that we are within additive 4 lnn/ǫ′ with probability at least 1 − 1/n2.
When cost(Fi) ≥ 6OPT+ 24k lnn/ǫ′, with probability 1− 1/n2 we have cost(Fi+1) ≤ (1− 1/6k)× cost(Fi).
This multiplicative decrease by (1 − 1/6k) applies for as long as cost(Fi) ≥ 6OPT + 24k lnn/ǫ′. Since
cost(F0) ≤ n∆, and n∆(1 − 1/6k)T ≤ ∆ ≤ 24k lnn/ǫ′, there must exist an i < T such that cost(Fi) ≤
6OPT+ 24k lnn/ǫ′, with probability at least (1− T/n2).
Finally, by applying the exponential mechanism again in the final stage, we select from the Fi scoring
within an additive 4 lnn/ǫ′ of the optimal visited Fi with probability at least 1 − 1/n2, again by (2.4).
Plugging in the value of ǫ′, we get the desired result. Increasing the constants in the additive term can drive
the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small polynomial.
4.1 k-Median Lower Bound
Theorem 4.5. Any ǫ-differentially private algorithm for the k-median problem must incur cost OPT+Ω(∆ ·
k ln(n/k)/ǫ) on some inputs.
Proof. Consider a point set V = [n] × [L] of nL points, with L = ln(n/k)/10ǫ, and a distance function
d((i, j), (i′, j′)) = ∆ whenever i 6= i′ and d((i, j), (i, j′)) = 0. Let M be a differentially private algorithm
that takes a subset D ⊆ V and outputs a set of k locations, for some k < n4 . Given the nature of the metric
space, we assume that M outputs a k-subset of [n]. For a set A ⊆ [n], let DA = A × [L]. Let A be a size-k
subset of V chosen at random.
We claim that that EA,M [|M(DA) ∩ A|] ≤ k2 for any ǫ-differentially private algorithm M . Before we
prove this claim, note that it implies the expected cost of M(DA) is
k
2 ×∆L, which proves the claim since
OPT = 0.
Now to prove the claim: define φ := 1kEA,M [|A ∩M(DA)|]. We can rewrite
k · φ = EA,M [|A ∩M(DA)|] = k · Ei∈[n]EA\{i},M [1i∈M(DA)]
Now changing A to A′ := A\{i}+{i′} for some random i′ requires altering at most 2L elements in DA′ , which
by the differential privacy guarantee should change the probability of the output by at most e2ǫL = (n/k)1/5.
Hence
Ei∈[n]EA′,M [1i∈M(DA′ )] ≥ φ · (k/n)1/5.
But the expression on the left is just k/n, since there at at most k medians. Hence φ ≤ (k/n)4/5 ≤ 1/2,
which proves the claim.
Corollary 4.6. Any 1-differentially private algorithm for uniform facility location that outputs the set of
chosen facilities must have approximation ratio Ω(
√
n).
Proof. We consider instances defined on the uniform metric on n points, with d(u, v) = 1 for all u, v, and
facility opening cost f = 1√
n
. Consider a 1-differentially private mechanism M when run on a randomly
chosen subset A of size k =
√
n. Since OPT is kf = 1 for these instances, any o(
√
n)-approximation must
select at least k2 locations from A in expectation. By an argument analogous to the above theorem, it follows
that any differentially private M must output n/20 of the locations in expectation. This leads to a facility
opening cost of Ω(
√
n).
4.2 Euclidean Setting
Feldman et al. [FFKN09] study private coresets for the k-median problem when the input points are in
ℜd. For P points in the unit ball in ℜd, they give coresets with (1 + ε) multiplicative error, and additive
errors about O(k2d2 log2 P ) and O(16kd)2dd3/2 logP log dk) respectively for their inefficient and efficient
algorithms. Since Euclidean k-median has a PTAS, this leads to k-median approximations with the same
guarantees. We can translate our results to their setting by looking at a (1/P )-net of the unit ball as the
candidate set of n-points, of which some may appear. This would lead to an inefficient algorithm with
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additive error O(kd logP ), and an efficient algorithm with additive error O(k2d2 log2 P ). The latter has a
multiplicative error of 6 and hence our efficient algorithms are incomparable. Note that coresets are more
general objects than just the k-median solution.
5 Vertex Cover
We now turn to the problem of (unweighted) vertex cover, where we want to pick a set S of vertices of
minimal size so that every edge in the graph is incident to at least one vertex in S. In the privacy-preserving
version of the problem, the private information we wish to conceal is the presence of absence of each edge.
Approximating the Vertex Cover Size. As mentioned earlier, even approximating the vertex cover size was
shown to be polynomially inapproximable under the constraint of functional privacy [HKKN01, BCNW06].
On the other hand, it is easy to approximate the size of the optimal vertex cover under differential privacy:
twice the size of a maximum matching is a 2-approximation to the optimal vertex cover, and this value only
changes by at most two with the presence or absence of a single edge. Hence, this value plus Laplace(2/ǫ)
noise provides ǫ-differential privacy [DMNS06]. (Here it is important that we use maximum rather than just
maximal matchings, since the size of the latter is not uniquely determined by the graph, and the presence or
absence of an edge may dramatically alter the size of the solution.) Interestingly enough, for weighted vertex
cover with maximum weight wmax (which we study in Section 5.2), we have to add in Lap(wmax/ǫ) noise
to privately estimate the weight of the optimal solution, which can be much larger than OPT itself. The
mechanism in Section 5.2 avoids this barrier by outputting an implicit representation of the vertex cover,
and hence gives us a O(1/ǫ) multiplicative approximation with ǫ-differential privacy.
The Vertex Cover Search Problem. If we want to find a vertex cover (and not just estimate its size), how can
we do this privately? In covering problems, the (private) data imposes hard constraints on the a solution,
making them quite different from, say, min-cut. Indeed, while the private data only influences the objective
function in the min-cut problem, the data determines the constraints defining feasible solutions in the case
of the vertex cover problem. This hard covering constraint make it impossible to actually output a small
vertex cover privately: as noted in the introduction, any differentially private algorithm for vertex cover that
outputs an explicit vertex cover (a subset of the n vertices) must output a cover of size at least n− 1 with
probability 1 on any input, an essentially useless result.
In order to address this challenge, we require our algorithms to output an implicit representation of a
cover: we privately output an orientation of the edges. Now for each edge, if we pick the endpoint that it
points to, we clearly get a vertex cover. Our analysis ensures that this vertex cover has size not much larger
than the size of the optimal vertex cover for the instance. Hence, such an orientation may be viewed as a
privacy-preserving set of instructions that allows for the construction of a good vertex cover in a distributed
manner: in the case of the undercover agents mentioned in the introduction, the complete set of active
dropoff sites (nodes) is not revealed to the agents, but an orientation on the edges tells each agent which
dropoff site to use, if she is indeed an active agent. Our algorithms in fact output a permutation of all
the vertices of the graph. Each edge can be considered oriented towards the endpoint appearing earlier in
the permutation. Our lower bounds apply to the more general setting where we are allowed to output any
orientation (and hence are stronger).
5.1 The Algorithm for Unweighted Vertex Cover
Our (randomized) algorithm will output a permutation, and the vertex cover will be defined by picking, for
each edge, whichever of its endpoints appears first in the permutation. We show that this vertex cover will
be (2 + O(1/ǫ))-approximate and ǫ-differentially private. Our algorithm is based on a simple (non-private)
2-approximation to vertex cover [Pit85] that repeatedly selects an uncovered edge uniformly at random, and
includes a random endpoint of the edge. We can view the process, equivalently, as selecting a vertex at
random with probability proportional to its uncovered degree. We will take this formulation and mix in a
uniform distribution over the vertices, using a weight that will grow as the number of remaining vertices
decreases.
Let us start from G1 = G, and let Gi be the graph with n − i + 1 vertices remaining. We will write
dv(G) for the degree of vertex v in graph G. The algorithm ALG in step i chooses from the n − i + 1
vertices of Gi with probability proportional to dv(Gi) + wi, for an appropriate sequence 〈wi〉. Taking
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wi = (4/ǫ) × (n/(n − i + 1))1/2 provides ǫ-differential privacy and a (2 + 16/ǫ) approximation factor, the
proof of which will follow from the forthcoming Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2.
As stated the algorithm outputs a sequence of vertices, one per iteration. As remarked above, this
permutation defines a vertex cover by picking the earlier occurring end point of each edge.
Algorithm 3 Unweighted Vertex Cover
1: let n← |V |, V1 ← V,E1 ← E.
2: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3: let wi ← (4/ǫ)×
√
n/(n− i+ 1).
4: pick a vertex v ∈ Vi with probability proportional to dEi(v) + wi.
5: output v. let Vi+1 ← Vi \ {v}, Ei+1 ← Ei \ ({v} × Vi).
6: end for
Theorem 5.1 (Privacy). ALG satisfies ǫ-differential privacy for the settings of wi above.
Proof. For any two sets of edges A and B, and any permutation π, let di be the degree of the i
th vertex in
the permutation π and let mi be the remaining edges, both ignoring edges incident to the first i− 1 vertices
in π.
Pr[ALG(A) = π]
Pr[ALG(B) = π]
=
n∏
i=1
(wi + di(A))/((n − i+ 1)wi + 2mi(A))
(wi + di(B))/((n− i+ 1)wi + 2mi(B)) .
When A and B differ in exactly one edge, di(A) = di(B) for all i except the first endpoint incident to the edge
in the difference. Until this termmi(A) andmi(B) differ by exactly one, and after this termmi(A) = mi(B).
The number of nodes is always equal, of course. Letting j be the index in π of the first endpoint of the edge
in difference, we can cancel all terms after j and rewrite
Pr[ALG(A) = π]
Pr[ALG(B) = π]
=
wj + dj(A)
wj + dj(B)
×
∏
i≤j
(n− i+ 1)wi + 2mi(B)
(n− i+ 1)wi + 2mi(A) .
An edge may have arrived in A, in which case mi(A) = mi(B)+1 for all i ≤ j, and each term in the product
is at most one; moreover, dj(A) = dj(B) + 1, and hence the leading term is at most 1 + 1/wj < exp(1/w1),
which is bounded by exp(ǫ/2).
Alternately, an edge may have departed from A, in which case the lead term is no more than one, but
each term in the product exceeds one and their product must now be bounded. Note thatmi(A)+1 = mi(B)
for all relevant i, and that by ignoring all other edges we only make the product larger. Simplifying, and
using 1 + x ≤ exp(x), we see
∏
i≤j
(n− i+ 1)wi + 2mi(B)
(n− i+ 1)wi + 2mi(A) ≤
∏
i≤j
(n− i+ 1)wi + 2
(n− i+ 1)wi + 0 =
∏
i≤j
(
1 +
2
(n− i+ 1)wi
)
≤ exp
∑
i≤j
2
(n− i+ 1)wi
 .
The wi are chosen so that
∑
i 2/(n− i+ 1)wi = (ε/
√
n)
∑
i 1/2
√
i is at most ε.
Theorem 5.2 (Accuracy). For all G, E[ALG(G)] ≤ (2+2 avgi≤n wi)×|OPT (G)| ≤ (2+16/ǫ)|OPT(G)|.
Proof. Let OPT (G) denote an arbitrary optimal solution to the vertex cover problem on G. The proof is
inductive, on the size n of G. For G with |OPT (G)| > n/2, the theorem holds. For G with |OPT (G)| ≤ n/2,
the expected cost of the algorithm is the probability that the chosen vertex v is incident to an edge, plus the
expected cost of ALG(G \ v).
E[ALG(G)] = Pr[v incident on edge] + Ev[E[ALG(G \ v)]] .
We will bound the second term using the inductive hypothesis. To bound the first term, the probability that
v is chosen incident to an edge is at most (2mwn+2m)/(nwn+2m), as there are at most 2m vertices incident
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to edges. On the other hand, the probability that we pick a vertex in OPT (G) is at least (|OPT (G)|wn +
m)/(nwn + 2m). Since |OPT (G)| is non-negative, we conclude that
Pr[v incident on edge] ≤ (2 + 2wn)(m/(nwn + 2m)) ≤ (2 + 2wn)Pr[v ∈ OPT (G)]
Since 1[v ∈ OPT (G)] ≤ |OPT (G)| − |OPT (G \ v)|, and using the inductive hypothesis, we get
E[ALG(G)] ≤ (2 + 2wn)× (|OPT (G)| − Ev[|OPT (G \ v)|]) + (2 + 2 avg
i<n
wi)× Ev[|OPT (G \ v)|]
= (2 + 2wn)× |OPT (G)|+ (2 avg
i<n
wi − 2wn)× Ev[|OPT (G \ v)|]
The probability that v is from an optimal vertex cover is at least (|OPT (G)|wi+m)/(nwi+2m), as mentioned
above, and (using (a+ b)/(c+ d) ≥ min{a/c, b/d}) is at least min{|OPT (G)|/n, 1/2} = |OPT (G)|/n, since
|OPT (G)| < n/2 by assumption. Thus E[|OPT (G \ v)|] is bounded above by (1− 1/n)× |OPT (G)|, giving
E[ALG(G)] ≤ (2 + 2wn)× |OPT (G)|+ (2 avg
i<n
wi − 2wn)× (1− 1/n)× |OPT (G)| .
Simplification yields the claimed results, and instantiating wi completes the proof.
Hallucinated Edges. Here is a slightly different way to implement the intuition behind the above algo-
rithm: imagine adding O(1/ǫ) “hallucinated” edges to each vertex (the other endpoints of these hallucinated
edges being fresh “hallucinated” vertices), and then sampling vertices without replacement proportional to
these altered degrees. However, once (say) n/2 vertices have been sampled, output the remaining vertices
in random order. This view will be useful to keep in mind for the weighted vertex cover proof. (A formal
analysis of this algorithm is in Appendix A.)
5.2 Weighted Vertex Cover
In the weighted vertex cover problem, each vertex V is assigned a weight w(v), and the cost of any vertex
cover is the sum of the weights of the participating vertices. One can extend the unweighted 2-approximation
that draws vertices at random with probability proportional to their uncovered degree to a weighted 2-
approximation by drawing vertices with probability proportional to their uncovered degree divided by their
weight. The differentially private analog of this algorithm essentially draws vertices with probability pro-
portional to 1/ǫ plus their degree, all divided by the weight of the vertex; the algorithm we present here is
based on this idea.
Define the score of a vertex to be s(v) = 1/w(v). Our algorithm involves hallucinating edges: to
each vertex, we add in 1/ǫ hallucinated edges, the other endpoints of which are imaginary vertices, whose
weight is considered to be ∞ (and hence has zero score). The score of an edge e = (u, v) is defined to be
s(e) = s(u) + s(v); hence the score of a fake edge f incident on u is s(f) = s(u), since its other (imaginary)
endpoint has infinite weight and zero score. We will draw edges with probability proportional to their
score, and then select an endpoint to output with probability proportional to its score. In addition, once a
substantial number of vertices of at least a particular weight have been output, we will output the rest of
those vertices.
Assume the minimum vertex weight is 1 and the maximum is 2J . For simplicity, we round the weight
of each vertex up to a power of 2, at a potential loss of a factor of two in the approximation. Define the
jth weight class Vj to be the set of vertices of weight 2
j . In addition, we will assume that |Vj | = |Vj+1| for
all weight classes. In order to achieve this, we hallucinate additional fake vertices. We will never actually
output a hallucinated vertex. Let Nj denote |Vj |.
We imagine the ith iteration of the outer loop of the algorithm as happening at time i; note that one
vertex is output in Step 3, whereas multiple vertices might be output in Step 6. Let n˜i be the sum of the
scores of all real vertices not output before time i, and m˜i be the sum of the scores of all real edges not
covered before time i.
5.2.1 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 5.3. The weighted vertex cover algorithm preserves O(ǫ) differential privacy.
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Algorithm 4 Weighted Vertex Cover
1: while not all vertices have been output do
2: pick an uncovered (real or hallucinated) edge e = (u, v) with probability proportional to s(e).
3: output endpoint u ∈ e with probability proportional to s(u).
4: while there exists some weight class Vj such that the number of nodes of class j or higher that we’ve
output is at least Nj/2 = |Vj |/2 do
5: pick the smallest such value of j
6: output (“dump”) all remaining vertices in Vj in random order.
7: end while
8: end while
Proof. Consider some potential output π of the private vertex cover algorithm, and two weighted vertex
cover instances A and B that are identical except for one edge e = (p, q). Let p appear before q in the
permutation π; since the vertex sets are the same, if the outputs of both A and B are π, then p will be
output at the same time t in both executions. Let vt be the vertex output in Step 3 at time t in such an
execution; note that either p = vt, or p is output in Step 6 after vt is output.
The probability that (conditioned on the history) a surviving vertex v is output in Step 3 of the algorithm
at time i is: ∑
edges ePr[pick e] ·Pr[output v | pick e] =
∑
e∋v
s(e)
emi+eni/ǫ
· s(v)s(e) = (d(v)+1/ǫ)·s(v)emi+eni/ǫ .
Since we compare the runs of the algorithm on A and B which differ only in edge e, these will be identical
after time t when e is covered, and hence
Pr[M(A)=π]
Pr[M(B)=π] =
(dA(vt)+1/ǫ)s(vt)
(dB(vt)+1/ǫ)s(vt)
∏
i≤t
(
emBi +eni/ǫ
emAi +eni/ǫ
)
.
Note that if the extra edge e ∈ A \ B then dA(vt) ≤ dB(vt) + 1 and m˜Bi ≤ m˜Ai , so the ratio of the
probabilities is at most 1+ ǫ < exp(ǫ). Otherwise, the leading term is less than 1 and m˜Bi = m˜
A
i + s(e), and
we get
Pr[M(A)=π]
Pr[M(B)=π] ≤
∏
i≤t
(
1 + s(e)
eni/ǫ
)
≤ exp
(
s(e) · ǫ ·∑i≤t 1eni ) .
Let Tj be the time steps i ≤ t where vertices in Vj are output in π. Letting 2j∗ be the weight of the
lighter endpoint of edge e, we can break the sum
∑
i≤t
1
eni
into two pieces and analyze each separately:∑
i≤t
1
eni
=
∑
j≤j∗
∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
+
∑
j>j∗
∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
,
For the first partial sum, for some j ≤ j∗, let∑i∈Tj 1eni = 1eni0 + 1eni1 +. . .+ 1eniλ such that i0 > i1 > . . . > iλ.
We claim that n˜i0 ≥ 2−j
∗
Nj∗/2. Indeed, since e has not yet been covered, we must have output fewer than
Nj∗/2 vertices from levels j
∗ or higher, and hence at least Nj∗/2 remaining vertices from Vj∗ contribute to
n˜i0 .
In each time step in Tj, at least one vertex of score 2
−j is output, so we have that n˜iℓ ≥ 2−j
∗
Nj∗/2+ℓ·2−j.
Hence ∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
≤ 1
2−j∗Nj∗/2
+ 1
2−j∗Nj∗/2+2−j
+ . . .+ 1
2−j∗Nj∗/2+Nj 2−j
.
Defining θ = 2−j
∗+j ·Nj∗/2, the expression above simplifies to
2j
(
1
θ +
1
θ+1 + . . .+
1
θ+Nj
)
≤ 2j ln
(
θ+Nj
θ
)
= 2j ln
(
1 +
Nj
θ
)
.
Now using the assumption on the size of the weight classes, we have Nj ≤ Nj∗ =⇒ Nj/θ ≤ 2j∗−j+1, and
hence
∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
≤ (j∗ − j + 2)2j, for any j ≤ j∗. Finally,∑
j≤j∗
∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
≤∑j≤j∗ (j∗ − j + 2)2j = O(2j∗).
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We now consider the other partial sum
∑
j>j∗
∑
i∈Tj
1
eni
. For any such value of i, we know that n˜i ≥
2−j
∗
Nj∗/2. Moreover, there are at most Nj∗/2 times when we output a vertex from some weight class
j ≥ j∗ before we output all of Vj∗ ; hence there are at most Nj∗/2 terms in the sum, each of which is at most
1
2−j∗ Nj∗/2
, giving a bound of 2j
∗
on the second partial sum. Putting the two together, we get that
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤ exp(s(e) · ǫ ·O(2j∗ )) = exp(O(ǫ)),
using the fact that s(e) ≤ 2 · 2−j∗ , since the lighter endpoint of e had weight 2j∗ .
5.2.2 Utility Analysis
Call a vertex v interesting if it is incident on a real uncovered edge when it is picked. Consider the weight
class Vj : let I
1
j ⊆ Vj be the set of interesting vertices output due to Steps 3, and I2j ⊆ Vj be the set of
interesting vertices of class j output due to Step 6. The cost incurred by the algorithm is
∑
j 2
j(|I1j |+ |I2j |).
Lemma 5.4. E[
∑
j 2
j |I1j |] ≤ 4(1+ε)ε OPT
Proof. Every interesting vertex that our algorithm picks in Steps 3 has at least one real edge incident on
it, and at most 1ε hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex v, the selection is due
to a real edge with probability at least 1/(1 + 1ε ). One can show that the (non-private) algorithm A that
selects only real edges is a 2-approximation [Pit85]. On the other hand each vertex in I1j can be coupled to
a step of A with probability ε/(1 + ε). Since we rounded up the costs by at most a factor of two, the claim
follows.
Lemma 5.5. E[|I2j |] ≤ 6E[
∑
j′≥j |I1j′ |]
Proof. Let tj denote the time that class j is dumped. Recall that by (5.2.1), we pick a surviving vertex v
with probability ∝ (d(v) + 1ε ) · s(v) at each step. This expression summed over all uninteresting vertices is
∪j′≥jVj′ is at most (1/ε)
∑
j′≥j 2
−j′Nj′ ≤ 2−j+1Nj/ε. On the other hand, at each step before time tj , all
the interesting vertices in I2j are available and the same expression summed over them is at least 2
−j|I2j |/ǫ.
Thus for any t ≤ tj , conditioned on outputting a vertex vt ∈ ∪j′≥jVj′ in Step 3, the probability that it
is interesting is at least
|I2j |2−j/ε
(|I2j |2−j+21−jNj)/ε ≥
|I2j |
3Nj
(using |I2j | ≤ Nj). Now since we output Nj/2 vertices
from ∪j′≥jVj′ in Step 3 before time tj , we conclude that E
[∑
j′≥j |I1j′ |
∣∣ |I2j | ] ≥ Nj2 × |I2j |3Nj = |I2j |6 . Taking
expectations completes the proof.
We can now compute the total cost of all the interesting vertices dumped in Steps 6 of the algorithm.
E[cost(
⋃
j I
2
j )] =
∑
j 2
j
E[|I2j |] ≤ 6
∑
j 2
j
∑
j′≥j E[|I1j′ |] ≤ 6
∑
j′ E[|I1j′ |] 2j
′+1 ≤ 12 · E[cost(⋃j I1j )].
Finally, combining this calculation with Lemma 5.4, we conclude that our algorithm gives an O(1ε ) approxi-
mation to the weighted vertex cover problem.
5.3 Vertex Cover Lower Bounds
Theorem 5.6. Any algorithm for the vertex cover problem that prescribes edge-orientations with ǫ-differential
privacy must have an Ω(1/ǫ) approximation guarantee, for any ǫ ∈ ( 1n , 1].
Proof. Let V = {1, 2, . . . , ⌈ 12ǫ⌉}, and let M be an ǫ-differentially private algorithm that takes as input a
private set E of edges, and outputs an orientation ME : V × V → V , with ME(u, v) ∈ {u, v} indicating
to the edge which endpoint to use. Picking two distinct vertices u 6= v uniformly at random (and equating
(u, v) with (v, u)), we have by symmetry:
Pru,v[M∅((u, v)) 6= u] = 12 .
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Let ⋆u = (V, {u} × (V \ {u})) be the star graph rooted at u. Since ⋆u and ∅ differ in at most 12ǫ − 1 < 1ǫ
edges and M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, we conclude that
Pru,v[M⋆u((u, v)) 6= u] ≥ 12e .
Thus the expected cost of M when input a uniformly random ⋆u is at least
1
2e × ⌈ 12ǫ⌉, while OPT(⋆u) is 1.
We can repeat this pattern arbitrarily, picking a random star from each group of 1/ǫ vertices; this results in
graphs with arbitrarily large vertex covers where M incurs cost 1/ǫ times the cost.
6 Set Cover
We now turn our attention to private approximations for the Set Cover Problem; here the set system (U,S)
is public, but the actual set of elements to be covered R ⊆ U is the private information. As for vertex cover,
we cannot explicitly output a set cover that is good and private at the same time. Hence, we again output a
permutation over all the sets in the set system; this implicitly defines a set cover for R by picking, for each
element R, the first set in this permutation that contains it. Our algorithms for set cover give the slightly
weaker (ǫ, δ)-privacy guarantees.
6.1 Unweighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (U,S) and must cover a private subset R ⊂ U . Let the cardinality of the set
system be |S| = m, and let |U | = n. We first observe a computationally inefficient algorithm.
Theorem 6.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to pick a permutation of sets, runs in time O(m!poly(n))
and gives an O(log(em/OPT)/ǫ)-approximation.
Proof. A random permutation, with probability at least
(
m
OPT
)−1
has all the sets in OPT before any set in
OPT
c. Thus the additive error is O(log
(
m
OPT
)
/ǫ).
The rest of the section gives a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees: this is
a modified version of the greedy algorithm, using the exponential mechanism to bias towards picking large
sets.
Algorithm 5 Unweighted Set Cover
1: Input: Set system (U,S), private R ⊂ U of elements to cover, ǫ,δ.
2: let i← 1, Ri = R, Si ← S. ǫ′ ← ǫ/2 ln( eδ ).
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
4: pick a set S from Si with probability proportional to exp(ǫ′|S ∩Ri|).
5: output set S.
6: Ri+1 ← Ri \ S, Si+1 ← Si − {S}.
7: end for
6.1.1 Utility Analysis
At the beginning of iteration i, say there aremi = m−i+1 remaining sets and ni = |Ri| remaining elements,
and define Li = maxS∈S |S ∩ Ri|, the largest number of uncovered elements covered by any set in S. By a
standard argument, any algorithm that always picks sets of size Li/2 is an O(lnn) approximation algorithm.
Theorem 6.2. The above algorithm achieves an expected approximation ratio of O(lnn+ lnmǫ′ ) = O(lnn+
lnm ln(e/δ)
ǫ ).
Proof. As there is at least one set containing Li elements, our use of the exponential mechanism to select sets
combined with Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability we select a set covering fewer than Li − 3 lnm/ǫ
elements is at most 1/m2. While Li > 6 lnm/ǫ, with probability at least (1−1/m) we always select sets that
cover at least Li/2 elements, and can therefore use no more than O(OPT lnn) sets. Once Li drops below
this bound, we observe that the number of remaining elements |Ri| is at most OPT · Li. Any permutation
therefore costs at most an additional O(OPT lnm/ǫ′).
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6.1.2 Privacy
Theorem 6.3. The unweighted set cover algorithm preserves (ǫ, δ) differential privacy for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
and δ < 1/e.
Proof. Let A and B be two set cover instances that differ in some element I. Say that SI is the collection
of sets containing I. Fix an output permutation π, and write si,j(A) to denote the size of set Sj after the
first i− 1 sets in π have been added to the cover.
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
=
n∏
i=1
(
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(A))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A)))
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(B))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B)))
)
=
exp(ǫ′ · st,πt(A))
exp(ǫ′ · st,πt(B))
·
t∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
where t is such that Sπt is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π. After t, the remaining
elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the tth term, the
numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A
contains I and B does not the first term is exp(ǫ′) and the each term in the product is at most 1.
Now suppose that B contains I and A does not . In this case, the first term is exp(−ǫ′) < 1. Moreover,
in instance B, every set in SI is larger by 1 than in A, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we
have:
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
(
(exp(ǫ′)− 1) ·∑j∈SI exp(ǫ′ · si,j(A)) +∑j exp(ǫ′ · si,j(A))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
=
t∏
i=1
(1 + (exp(ǫ′)− 1) · pi(A))
where pi(A) is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance
A, conditioned on picking the sets Sπ1 , . . . , Sπi−1 in the previous steps.
For an instanceA and an element I ∈ A, we say that an output σ is q-bad if∑i pi(A)1(I uncovered at step i)
(strictly) exceeds q, where pi(A) is as defined above. We call a permutation q-good otherwise. We first con-
sider the case when the output π is (ln δ−1)-good. By the definition of t, we have
t−1∑
i=1
pi(A) ≤ ln δ−1.
Continuing the analysis from above,
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
exp((exp(ǫ′)− 1)pi(A)) ≤ exp(2ǫ′
t∑
i=1
pi(A))
≤ exp(2ǫ′(ln(1
δ
) + pt(A))) ≤ exp(2ǫ′(ln(1
δ
) + 1)).
Thus, for any (ln δ−1)-good output π, we have Pr[M(A)=π]
Pr[M(B)=π] ≤ exp(ǫ). We can then invoke the following
lemma, proved in appendix B
Lemma 6.4. For any set system (U,S), any instance A and any I ∈ A, the probability that the output π of
the algorithm above is q-bad is bounded by exp(−q).
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Thus for any set P of outcomes, we have
Pr[M(A) ∈ P ] =
∑
π∈P
Pr[M(A) = π]
=
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1)-good
Pr[M(A) = π] +
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1)-bad
Pr[M(A) = π]
≤
∑
π∈P:π is (ln δ−1)-good
exp(ǫ)Pr[M(B) = π] + δ
≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[M(B) ∈ P ] + δ.
Corollary 6.5. For ǫ < 1 and δ = 1/poly(n), there is an O( ln n lnmǫ )-approximation algorithm for the
unweighted set cover problem preserving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
6.2 Weighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (U,S) and a cost function C : S → R. We must cover a private subset R ⊂ U .
W.l.o.g., let minS∈S C(S) = 1, and denote maxS∈S C(S) = W . Let the cardinality of the set system be
|S| = m, and let |U | = n.
Algorithm 6 Weighted Set Cover
1: let i← 1, Ri = R, Si ← S, ri ← n, ǫ′ = ǫ2 ln(e/δ) , T = Θ
( logm+log log(nW )
ǫ′
)
2: while ri ≥ 1/W do
3: pick a set S from Si with probability proportional to exp
(
ǫ′
( |S ∩Ri| − ri · C(S) ))
or halve with probability proportional to exp(−ǫ′T )
4: if halve then
5: let ri+1 ← ri/2, Ri+1 ← Ri, Si+1 ← Si, i← i+ 1
6: else
7: output set S
8: let Ri+1 ← Ri \ S, Si+1 ← Si − {S}, ri+1 ← ri, i← i+ 1
9: end if
10: end while
11: output all remaining sets in Si in random order
Let us first analyze the utility of the algorithm. If R = ∅, the algorithm has cost zero and there is nothing
to prove. So we can assume that OPT ≥ 1. We first show that (whp) ri ' Ri/OPT.
Lemma 6.6. Except with probability 1/ poly(m), we have ri ≥ |Ri|2OPT for all iterations i.
Proof. Clearly r1 = n ≥ |R1|/2OPT. For ri to fall below |Ri|/2, it must be in ( |Ri|2OPT , |Ri|OPT ] and be halved in
Step 6 of some iteration i. We’ll show that this is unlikely: if at some iteration i, |Ri|2OPT ≤ ri ≤ |Ri|OPT , then
we argue that with high probability, the algorithm will not output halve and thus not halve ri. Since all
remaining elements Ri can be covered at cost at most OPT, there must exist a set S such that
|S∩Ri|
C(S) ≥ |Ri|OPT ,
and hence |S ∩Ri| ≥ C(S) · |Ri|OPT ≥ C(S) · ri.
Hence ui(S) := |S ∩ Ri| − ri · C(S) ≥ 0 in this case, and the algorithm will output S with probability
at least proportional to 1, whereas it outputs halve with probability proportional to exp(−ǫ′T ). Thus,
Pr[ algorithm returns halve ] < exp(−ǫ′T ) = 1/ poly(m lognW ). Since there are m sets in total, and
r ranges from n to 1/W , there are at most m + O(log nW ) iterations, and the proof follows by a union
bound.
Let us define a score function ui(S) := |S ∩ Ri| − ri · C(S), and ui(halve) := −T : note that in Step 4
of our algorithm, we output either halve or a set S, with probabilities proportional to exp(ǫ′ui(·)). The
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following lemma states that with high probability, none of the sets output by our algorithm have very low
scores (since we are much more likely to output halve than a low-scoring set).
Lemma 6.7. Except with probability at most 1/ poly(m), Step 4 only returns sets S with ui(S) ≥ −2T .
Proof. There are at most |Si| ≤ m sets S with score ui(S) ≤ −2T , and so one is output with probability
at most proportional to m exp(−2T ǫ). We will denote this bad event by B. On the other hand, halve is
output with probability proportional to exp(−T ǫ). Hence, Pr[halve]/Pr[B] ≥ exp(T ǫ)/m, and so Pr[B] ≤
m/ exp(T ǫ) ≤ 1/ poly(m lognW ). Again there are at most m+O(lognW ) iterations, and the lemma follows
by a trivial union bound.
We now analyze the cost incurred by the algorithm in each stage. Let us divide the algorithm’s execution
into stages : stage j consists of all iterations i where |Ri| ∈ ( n2j , n2j−1 ]. Call a set S interesting if it is incident
on an uncovered element when it is picked. Let Ij be the set of interesting sets selected in stage j, and C(Ij)
be the total cost incurred on these sets.
Lemma 6.8. Consider stages 1, . . . , j of the algorithm. Except with probability 1/ poly(m), we can bound
the cost of the interesting sets in stage 1, . . . , j by:∑
j′≤j
C(Ij′ ) ≤ 4jOPT · (1 + 2T ).
Proof. By Lemma 6.7 all the output sets have ui(Si) ≥ −2T whp. Rewriting, each Si selected in a round
j′ ≤ j satisfies
C(Si) ≤ |Si ∩Ri|+ 2T
ri
≤ 2
j′+1
OPT
n
(|Si ∩Ri|+ 2T ),
where the second inequality is whp, and uses Lemma 6.6. Now summing over all rounds j′ ≤ j, we get
∑
j′≤j
C(Ij′ ) ≤
∑
j′≤j
2j
′+1 OPT
n
( ∑
i s.t. Si∈Ij′
(|Si ∩Ri|+ 2T )).
Consider the inner sum for any particular value of j′: let the first iteration in stage j′ be iteration i0—
naturally Ri ⊆ Ri0 for any iteration i in this stage. Now, since Si ∩ Ri ⊆ Ri0 and Si ∩ Ri is disjoint
from Si′ ∩ Ri′ , the sum over |Si ∩ Ri| is at most |Ri0 |, which is at most n2j′−1 by definition of stage j′.
Moreover, since we are only concerned with bounding the cost of interesting sets, each |Si ∩Ri| ≥ 1, and so
|Si ∩Ri|+ 2T ≤ |Si ∩Ri|(1 + 2T ). Putting this together, (6.2) implies∑
j′≤j
C(Ij′ ) ≤
∑
j′≤j
2j
′+1 OPT
n
× n
2j′−1
(1 + 2T ) = 4jOPT (1 + 2T ),
which proves the lemma.
Theorem 6.9 (Utility). The weighted set cover algorithm incurs a cost of O(T lognOPT) except with
probability 1/ poly(m).
Proof. Since the number of uncovered elements halves in each stage by definition, there are at most 1+ logn
stages, which by Lemma 6.8 incur a total cost of at most O(log n OPT · (1+ 2T )). The sets that remain and
are output at the very end of the algorithm incur cost at most W for each remaining uncovered element;
since ri < 1/W at the end, Lemma 6.6 implies that |Ri| < 2OPT/W (whp), giving an additional cost of at
most 2OPT.
We can adapt the above argument to bound the expected cost by O(T logn OPT).
Theorem 6.10 (Privacy). For any δ > 0, the weighted set cover algorithm preserves (ǫ, δ) differential
privacy.
17
Proof. We imagine that the algorithm outputs a set named “HALVE” when Step 4 of the algorithm returns
halve, and show that even this output is privacy preserving. Let A and B be two set cover instances that
differ in some element I. Say that SI is the collection of sets containing I. Fix an output π, and write
ui,j(A) to denote the score of πj (recall this may be halve) after the first i− 1 sets in π have been selected.
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
=
n∏
i=1
(
exp(ǫ′ · ui,πi(A))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · ui,j(A)))
exp(ǫ′ · ui,πi(B))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · ui,j(B)))
)
=
exp(ǫ′ · ut,πt(A))
exp(ǫ′ · ut,πt(B))
·
t∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · ui,j(B))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · ui,j(A))
)
where t is such that Sπt is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π. After t, the remaining
elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the tth term, the
numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A
contains I and B does not the first term is exp(ǫ′) and the each term in the product is at most 1. Since
ǫ′ ≤ ǫ, we conclude that in this case, for any set P of outputs, Pr[M(A) ∈ P ] ≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[M(B) ∈ P ].
Now suppose that B contains I and A does not . In this case, the first term is exp(−ǫ′) < 1. Moreover,
in instance B, every set in SI is larger by 1 than in A, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we
have:
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
(
(exp(ǫ′)− 1) ·∑j∈SI exp(ǫ′ · ui,j(A)) +∑j exp(ǫ′ · ui,j(A))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · ui,j(A))
)
=
t∏
i=1
(
1 + (eǫ
′ − 1) · pi(A)
)
where pi(A) is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance
A, conditioned on picking the sets Sπ1 , . . . , Sπi−1 in the previous steps.
For an instanceA and an element I ∈ A, we say that an output σ is q-bad if∑i pi(A)1(I uncovered at step i)
(strictly) exceeds q, where pi(A) is as defined above. We call a permutation q-good otherwise. We first con-
sider the case when the output π is (ln δ−1)-good. By the definition of t, we have
t−1∑
i=1
pi(A) ≤ ln δ−1.
Continuing the analysis from above,
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
t∏
i=1
exp((exp(ǫ′)− 1)pi(A)) ≤ exp
(
2ǫ′
t∑
i=1
pi(A)
)
≤ exp (2ǫ′ (ln δ−1 + pt(A))) ≤ exp (2ǫ′ (ln δ−1 + 1)) .
Thus, for any (ln δ−1)-good output π, we have Pr[M(A)=π]
Pr[M(B)=π] ≤ exp(ǫ).
Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we can use lemma 6.4 to complete the proof.
6.3 Removing the Dependence on W
We can remove the dependence of the algorithm on W with a simple idea. For an instance I = (U,S), let
Sj = {S ∈ S | C(S) ∈ (nj , nj+1] }. Let U j be the set of elements such that the cheapest set containing them
is in Sj . Suppose that for each j and each S ∈ Sj , we remove all elements that can be covered by a set of
cost at most nj−1, and hence define S′ to be S ∩ (U j ∪ U j−1). This would change the cost of the optimal
solution only by a factor of 2, since if we were earlier using S in the optimal solution, we can pick S′ and at
most n sets of cost at most nj−1 to cover the elements covered by S \ S′. Call this instance I ′ = (U,S ′).
Now we partition this instance into two instances I1 and I2, where I1 = (∪j evenU j ,S ′), and where
I2 = (∪j oddU j ,S ′). Since we have just partitioned the universe, the optimal solution on both these instances
costs at most 2OPT(I). But both these instances I1, I2 are themselves collections of disjoint instances, with
each of these instances having wmax/wmin ≤ n2; this immediately allows us to remove the dependence on
W . Note that this transformation is based only on the set system (U,S), and not on the private subset R.
Theorem 6.11. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), δ = 1/ poly(n), there is an O(logn(logm+ log logn)/ǫ)-approximation
for the weighted set cover problem that preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
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6.4 Lower bounds
Theorem 6.12. Any ǫ-differentially private algorithm that maps elements to sets must have approxi-
mation factor Ω(logm/ǫ), for a set cover instance with m sets and ((logm)/ǫ)O(1) elements, for any
ǫ ∈ (2 logm/m 120 , 1).
Proof. We consider a set system with |U | = N and S a uniformly random selection of m size-k subsets of
U . We will consider problem instances Si consisting of one of these m subsets, so OPT(Si) = 1. Let M be
an ǫ-differentially private algorithm that on input T ⊆ U , outputs an assignment f mapping each element
in U to some set in S that covers it. The number of possible assignments is at most mN . The cost on input
T under an assignment f is the cardinality of the set f(T ) = ∪e∈T f(e).
We say assignment f is good for a subset T ⊆ U if its cost |f(T )| is at most l = k2 . We first show that
any fixed assignment f : U → [m], such that |f−1(j)| ≤ k for all j, is unlikely to be good for a randomly
picked size-k subset T of U . The number of ways to choose l sets from among those with non-empty f−1(·)
is at most
(
N
l
)
. Thus the probability that f is good for a random size-k subset is at most
(
N
l
) (
lk
N
)k
. Setting
k = N1/10, and l = k2 , this is at most(
Ne
l
)l (
lk
N
)k
=
(
ek3
2N
)k/2
≤ 2−k logN/4.
Let m = 22ǫk. The probability that f is good for at least t of our m randomly picked sets is bounded by(
m
t
)(
2−k logN/4
)t
≤ 22ǫkt2−tk logN/4 ≤ 2−tk log k/8.
Thus, with probability at most 2−Nk log k/8, a fixed assignment is good for more than N of m randomly
chosen size-k sets. Taking a union bound over mN = 22ǫkN possible assignments, the probability that any
feasible assignment f is good for more than N sets is at most 2−Nk log k/16. Thus there exists a selection of
size-k sets S1, . . . , Sm such that no feasible assignment f is good for more than N of the Si’s.
Let pM(∅)(Si) be the probability that an assignment drawn from the distribution defined by running M
on the the empty set as input is good for Si. Since any fixed assignment is good for at most N of the m sets,
the average value of pM(∅) is at most N/m. Thus there exists a set, say S1 such that pM(∅)(S1) ≤ N/m. Since
|Si| = k and M is ǫ-differentially private, pM(S1)(S1) ≤ exp(ǫk)pM(∅)(S1) < 12 . Thus with probability at
least half, the assignmentM picks on S1 is not good for S1. Since OPT(S1) = 1, the expected approximation
ratio of M is at least l/2 = logm4ǫ .
Additionally, one can take s distinct instances of the above problem, leading to a new instance on s ·N
elements and s ·m sets. OPT is now s, while it is easy to check that any private algorithm must cost Ω(s · l)
in expectation. Thus the lower bound in fact rules out additive approximations.
6.5 An Inefficient Algorithm for Weighted Set Cover
For completeness, we now show that the lower bound shown above is tight even in the weighted case, in the
absence of computational constraints. Recall that we are given a collection S of subsets of a universe U ,
and a private subset R ⊆ U of elements to be covered. Additionally, we have weights on sets; we round up
weights to powers of 2, so that sets in Sj have weight exactly 2−j. Without loss of generality, the largest
weight is 1 and the smallest weight is w = 2−L.
As before, we will output a permutation π on S, with the understanding that the cost cost(R, π) of a
permutation π on input R is defined to be the total cost of the set cover resulting from picking the first set
in the permutation containing e, for each e ∈ R.
Our algorithm constructs this permutation in a gradual manner. It maintains a permutation πj on ∪i≤jSi
and a threshold Tj. In step j, given πj−1 and Tj−1, the algorithm constructs a partial permutation πj on
∪i≤jSj , and a threshold Tj. In each step, we use the exponential mechanism to select an extension with an
appropriate base distribution µj and score function q. At the end of step L, we get our permutation π = πL
on S.
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Our permutations πj will all have a specific structure. The weight of the ith set in the permutation, as a
function of i will be a unimodal function that is non-increasing until Tj , and then non-decreasing. In other
words, πj contains sets from Sj as a continuous block. The sets that appear before Tj are said to be in the
bucket. We call a partial permutation respecting this structure good. We say a good permutation π extends
a good partial permutation πj if πj and π agree on their ordering on ∪i≤jSi.
We first define the score function that is used in these choices. A natural objective function would be
cost(R, πj) = minπ extends πj cost(R, π), i.e. the cost of the optimal solution conditioned on respecting the
partial permutation πj . We use a slight modification of this score function: we force the cover to contain
all sets from the bucket and denote as c˜ost(R, π) the resulting cover defined by R on π. We then define
c˜ost(R, πj) naturally as minπ extends πj c˜ost(R, π). We first record the following easy facts:
Observation 6.13. For any R, minπ c˜ost(R, π) = minπ cost(R, π) = OPT. Moreover, for any π, c˜ost(R, π) ≥
cost(R, π).
To get (πj , Tj) given (πj−1, Tj−1), we insert a permutation σj of Sj after the first Tj−1 elements of πj−1,
and choose Tj , where both σj and Tj are chosen using the exponential mechanism. The base measure on σj
is uniform and the base measure on Tj − Tj−1 is the geometric distribution with parameter 1/m2.
Let c˜ost(A, (σj , Tj)) be defined as c˜ost(A, πj) − c˜ost(A, πj−1), where πj is constructed from πj−1 and
(σj , Tj) as above. The score function we use to pick (σj , Tj) is scorej(R, (σj , Tj)) = 2
j c˜ost(R, (σj , Tj)).
Thus Pr[(σj , Tj)] ∝ (1/m2(Tj − Tj−1)) exp(εscore((σj , Tj))).
Let the optimal solution to the instance contain nj sets from Sj . Thus OPT =
∑
j 2
−jnj . We first show
that c˜ost(R, πL) is O(OPT logm/ε). By Observation 6.13, the approximation guarantee would follow.
The probability that the nj sets in OPT fall in the bucket when picking from the base measure is at least
1/m3nj . When that happens, c˜ost(R, πj) = c˜ost(R, πj−1). Thus the exponential mechanism ensures that
except with probability 1/poly(m):
c˜ost(R, πj) ≤ c˜ost(R, πj−1) + 4 · 2−j log(m3nj )/ǫ = c˜ost(R, πj−1) + 12 · 2−jnj logm/ǫ
Thus with high probability,
c˜ost(R, πL) ≤ c˜ost(R, π0) + 12
∑
j
2−jnj logm/ǫ
= OPT+ 12OPT logm/ǫ
Finally, we analyze the privacy. Let e ∈ U be an element such that the cheapest set covering U has
cost 2−je . Let A and B be two instances that differ in element e. It is easy to see that |c˜ost(A, (σj , Tj)) −
c˜ost(B, (σj , Tj))| is bounded by 2−j for all j. We show something stronger:
Lemma 6.14. For any good partial permutation πj and any A,B such that A = B ∪ {e},
|score(A, (σj , Tj))− scorej(B, (σj , Tj))| ≤
{
0 if j > je
2je−j+1 ifj ≤ je
Proof. Let πB be the permutation realizing c˜ost(B). For j ≤ je, if e is covered by a set in the bucket in πB ,
then the cost of πB is no larger in instance A and hence c˜ost(A, πj) = c˜ost(B, πj)
1. In the case that the
bucket in πB does not cover e, then c˜ost(A, πj) ≤ c˜ost(A, πB) = c˜ost(B, πB) + 2−je = c˜ost(B, πj) + 2−je .
Since this also holds for πj−1, this implies the claim from j ≤ je.
For j > je, observe that the first set in πB that covers e is fully determined by the partial permutation
πj , since the sets in ∪i>jeSi do not contain e. Thus c˜ost(A, (σj , Tj)) = c˜ost(B, (σj , Tj)) and the claim
follows.
1We remark that this is not true for the function cost, and is the reason we had to modify it to gcost.
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Then for any j ≤ je, lemma 6.14 implies that for any (σj , Tj), exp(ǫ(score(A, (σj , Tj))−score(B, (σj , Tj)))) ∈
[exp(−ǫ2je−j+1), exp(ǫ2je−j+1)]. Thus
Pr[σj , Tj|A]
Pr[σj , Tj |B] ∈ [exp(−2
j−je+2ǫ), exp(2j−je+2ǫ)]
Moreover, for any j > je, this ratio is 1. Thus
Pr[σj , Tj|A]
Pr[σj , Tj |B] ∈ [Πj≤je exp(−2
j−je+2ǫ),Πj≤je exp(2
j−je+2ǫ)]
⊆ [exp(−8ǫ), exp(8ǫ)],
which implies 8ǫ-differential privacy.
7 Facility Location
Consider the metric facility location problem: we are given a metric space (V, d), a facility cost f and a
(private) set of demand pointsD ⊆ V . We want to select a set of facilities F ⊆ V to minimize∑v∈D d(v, F )+
f · |F |. (Note that we assume “uniform” facility costs here instead of different costs fi for different i ∈ V .)
Assume that distances are at least 1, and let ∆ = maxu,v d(u, v) denote the diameter of the space.
We use the result of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04] that any metric space on n points can be approximated
by a distribution over dominating trees with expected stretch O(log n); moreover all the trees in the support
of the distribution are rooted 2-HSTs—they have L = O(log∆) levels, with the leaves (at level 0) being
exactly = V , the internal nodes being all Steiner nodes, the root having level L, and all edges between
levels (i + 1) and i having length 2i. Given such a tree T and node v at level i, let Tv denote the (vertices
in) the subtree rooted at v.
By Corollary 4.6, it is clear that we cannot output the actual set of facilities, so we will instead output
instructions in the form of an HST T = (VT , ET ) and a set of facilities F ⊆ VT : each demand x ∈ D then
gets assigned to its ancestor facility at the lowest level in the tree. (We guarantee that the root is always in
F , hence this is well-defined.) Now we are charged for the connection costs, and for the facilities that have
at least one demand assigned to them.
Algorithm 7 The Facility Location Algorithm
1: Input: Metric (V, d), facility cost f , demands D ⊆ V ,ǫ.
2: Pick a random distance-preserving FRT tree T ; recall this is a 2-HST with L = O(log∆) levels.
3: let F ← root r.
4: for i = 1 to L do
5: for all vertices v at level i do
6: let Nv = |D ∩ Tv| and N˜v = Nv + Lap(L/ǫ).
7: if N˜v · 2i > f then F ← F ∪ v.
8: end for
9: end for
10: output (T, F ): each demand x ∈ D is assigned to the ancestor facility at lowest level in T .
Theorem 7.1. The above algorithm preserves ǫ-differential privacy and outputs a solution of cost OPT ·
O(log n log∆) · log∆ǫ log
(
n log2 ∆
ǫ
)
.
For the privacy analysis, instead of outputting the set F we could imagine outputting the tree T and
all the counts N˜v; this information clearly determines F . Note that the tree is completely oblivious of the
demand set. Since adding or removing any particular demand vertex can only change L counts, and the
noise added in Step 6 gives us ε/L-differential privacy, the fact that differential privacy composes linearly
gives us the privacy claim.
For the utility analysis, consider the “noiseless” version of the algorithm which opens a facility at v when
Nv · 2i ≥ f . It can be shown that this ideal algorithm incurs cost at most f + O(log n log∆) · OPT (see,
e.g., [Ind04, Theorem 3]). We now have two additional sources of error due to the noise:
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• Consider the case when Nv · 2i ≥ f > N˜v · 2i, which increases the connection cost of some demands in
D. However, the noise is symmetric, and so we overshoot the mark with probability at most 1/2—and
when this happens the 2-HST property ensures that the connection cost for any demand x increases
by at most a factor of 2. Since there are at most L = O(log∆) levels, the expected connection cost
increases by at most a factor of L.
• Consider the other case when Nv · 2i < f ≤ N˜v · 2i, which increases the facility cost. Note that if
Nv · 2i ≥ f/2, then opening a facility at v can be charged again in the same way as for the noiseless
algorithm (up to a factor of 2). Hence suppose that N˜v−Nv ≥ 12 (f/2i), and hence we need to consider
the probability pi of the event that Lap(L/ǫ) >
1
2 (f/2
i), which is just Lǫ exp(− f2i+1 ǫL ).
Note that if for some value of i, f ≥ L 2i+1ǫ log L
2n
ε , the above probability pi is at most 1/Ln, and
hence the expected cost of opening up spurious facilities at nodes with such values of i is at most
(1/Ln) · Ln · f = f . (There are L levels, and at most n nodes at each level.)
For the values of i which are higher; i.e., for which f < L 2
i+1
ǫ log
L2n
ε , we pay for this facility only if
there is a demand x ∈ D in the subtree below v that actually uses this facility. Hence this demand x
must have used a facility above v in the noiseless solution, and we can charge the cost f of opening
this facility to length of the edge 2i+1 above v. Thus the total cost of spurious facilities we pay for is
the cost of the noiseless solution times a factor Lǫ log
L2n
ε .
Thus the expected cost of the solution is at most
OPT ·O(log n log∆) · log∆
ǫ
log
(
n log2∆
ǫ
)
. (7.8)
8 Combinatorial Public Projects (Submodular Maximization)
Recently Papadimitriou et al.[PSS08] introduced the Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPP Problem)
and showed that there is a succinctly representable version of the problem for which, although there exists
a constant factor approximation algorithm, no efficient truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation
ratio better than m
1
2−ǫ, unless NP ⊆ BPP . Here we adapt our set cover algorithm to give a privacy
preserving approximation to the CPP problem within logarithmic (additive) factors.
In the CPP problem, we have n agents and m resources publicly known. Each agent submits a private
non-decreasing and submodular valuation function fi over subsets of resources, and our goal is to select a size-
k subset S of the resources to maximize
∑n
i=1 fi(S). We assume that we have oracle access to the functions
fi. Note that since each fi is submodular, so is
∑n
i=1 fi(S), and our goal is to produce a algorithm for
submodular maximization that preserves the privacy of the individual agent valuation functions. Without loss
of generality, we will scale the valuation functions such that they take maximum value 1: maxi,S fi(S) = 1.
Once again, we have an easy computationally inefficient algorithm.
Theorem 8.1. The exponential mechanism when used to choose k sets runs in time O(
(
m
k
)
poly(n)) and has
expected quality at least (1− 1/e)OPT −O(log (mk )/ǫ).
We next give a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees. We adapt our un-
weighted set cover algorithm, simply selecting k items greedily:
Algorithm 8 CPP Problem
1: Input: A set of M of m resources, private functions f1, . . . , fn, a number of resources k, ǫ, δ.
2: let M1 ←M , F (x) :=
∑m
i=1 fi(x), S1 ← ∅, ǫ′ ← ǫe ln(e/δ) .
3: for i = 1 to k do
4: pick a resource r from Mi with probability proportional to exp(ǫ
′(F (Si + {r})− F (Si))).
5: let Mi+1 ←Mi − {r}, Si+1 ← Si + {r}.
6: end for
7: Output Sk+1.
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8.1 Utility Analysis
Theorem 8.2. Except with probability O(1/poly(n)), the algorithm for the CPP problem returns a solution
with quality at least (1 − 1/e)OPT−O(k logm/ǫ′).
Proof. Since F is submodular and there exists a set S∗ with |S| = k and F (S) = OPT, there always exists
a resource r such that F (Si + {r}) − F (Si) ≥ (OPT − F (Si))/k. If we always selected the optimizing
resource, the distance to OPT would decrease by a factor of 1 − 1/k each round, and we would achieve
an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e. Instead, we use the exponential mechanism which, by (2.4), selects a
resource within 4 lnm/ǫ′ of the optimizing resource with probability at least 1− 1/m3. With probability at
least 1 − k/m3 each of the k selections decreases OPT − F (Si) by a factor of (1 − 1/k), while increasing it
by at most an additive 4 lnm/ǫ′, giving (1− 1/e)OPT+O(k lnm/ǫ′).
8.2 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 8.3. For any δ ≤ 1/2, the CPP problem algorithm preserves (ǫ′(e − 1) ln(e/δ), δ)-differential
privacy.
Proof. Let A and B be two CPP instances that differ in a single agent I with utility function fI . We show
that the output set of resources, even revealing the order in which the resources were chosen, is privacy
preserving. Fix some ordered set of k resources, π1, . . . , πk write Si =
⋃i−1
j=1{π(j)} to denote the first i − 1
elements, and write si,j(A) = FA(Si + {j}) − FA(Si) to denote the marginal utility of item j at time i in
instance A. Define si,j(B) similarly for instance B. We consider the relative probability of our mechanism
outputting ordering π when given inputs A and B:
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
=
k∏
i=1
(
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(A))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A)))
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(B))/(
∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B)))
)
,
where the sum over j is over all remaining unselected resources. We can separate this into two products
k∏
i=1
(
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(A))
exp(ǫ′ · si,πi(B))
)
·
k∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
.
IfA contains agent I butB does not, the second product is at most 1, and the first is at most exp(ǫ′
∑k
i=1(FI(Si)−
FI(Si−1))) ≤ exp(ǫ′). If B contains agent I, and A does not, the first product is at most 1, and in the re-
mainder of the proof, we focus on this case. We will write βi,j = si,j(B) − si,j(A) to be the additional
marginal utility of item j at time i in instance B over instance A, due to agent I. Thus
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤
k∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(B))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
=
k∏
i=1
(∑
j exp(ǫ
′βi,j) · exp(ǫ′ · si,j(A))∑
j exp(ǫ
′ · si,j(A))
)
=
k∏
i=1
Ei[exp(ǫ
′βi)],
where βi is the marginal utility actually achieved at time i by agent I, and the expectation is taken over the
probability distribution over resources selected at time i in instance A. For all x ≤ 1, ex ≤ 1 + (e − 1) · x.
Therefore, for all ǫ′ ≤ 1, we have:
k∏
i=1
Ei[exp(ǫ
′βi)] ≤
k∏
i=1
Ei[1 + (e− 1)ǫ′βi]
≤ exp((e − 1)ǫ′
k∑
i=1
Ei[βi]).
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As in the set-cover proof, we split the set of possible outputs into two sets. We call an output sequence
q-good for an agent I in instance A if this sum
∑k
i=1Ei[βi] is bounded above by q, and call it q-bad otherwise.
For a (ln(eδ−1))-good output π, we can then write
Pr[M(A) = π]
Pr[M(B) = π]
≤ exp((e − 1)ǫ′ · ln(eδ−1).
Moreover, note that since the total realized utility of any agent is at most 1, if agent I has realized utility
ui−1 before the ith set is chosen, then βi is distributed in [0, 1−ui−1]. Moreover, ui = ui−1+βi. Lemma B.2
then implies that the probability that the algorithms outputs a (ln(eδ−1))-bad permutation is at most δ.
The theorem follows.
Remark 1. By choosing ǫ′ = ǫ/k, we immediately get ǫ-differential privacy and expected utility at least
(1− 1/e)OPT−O(k2 lnm/ǫ). This may give better guarantees for some values of k and δ.
We remark that the k-coverage problem is a special case of the CPP problem. Therefore:
Corollary 8.4. The CPP algorithm (with sets as resources) is an (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy preserving algo-
rithm for the k-coverage problem achieving approximation factor at least (1−1/e)OPT−O(k logm log(2/δ)/ǫ).
8.3 Truthfulness
The CPP problem can be viewed as a mechanism design problem when each agent i has a choice of whether
to submit his actual valuation function fi, or to lie and submit a different valuation function f
′
i if such a
misrepresentation yields a better outcome for agent i. A mechanism is truthful if for every valuation function
of agents j 6= i, and every valuation function fi of agent i, there is never a function f ′i 6= fi such that agent
i can benefit by misrepresenting his valuation function as f ′i . Intuitively, a mechanism is approximately
truthful if no agent can make more than a slight gain by not truthfully reporting.
Definition 3. A mechanism for the CPP problem is γ-truthful if for every agent i, for every set of player
valuations fj for j 6= i, and for every valuation function f ′i 6= fi:
E[fi(M(f1, . . . , fi, . . . , fn))] ≥ E[fi(M(f1, . . . , f ′i , . . . , fn))]− γ
Note that 0-truthfulness corresponds to the usual notion of (exact) truthfulness.
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy in our setting immediately implies (2ǫ+ δ)-approximate truthfulness. We note
that Papadimitriou et al. [PSS08] showed that the CPP problem is inapproximable to anm
1
2−ǫ multiplicative
factor by any polynomial time 0-truthful mechanism. Our result shows that relaxing that to γ-truthfulness
allows us to give a constant approximation to the utility whenever OPT ≥ 2k logm log(1/γ)/γ for any γ.
8.4 Lower Bounds
Theorem 8.5. No ǫ-differentially private algorithm for the maximum coverage problem can guarantee profit
larger than OPT− (k log(m/k)/20ǫ).
The proof is almost identical to that of the lower bound Theorem 4.5 for k-median, and hence is omitted.
9 Steiner Forest
Consider the Steiner network problem, where we are given a metric space M = (V, d) on n points, and
a (private) subset R ⊆ V × V of source-sink (terminal) pairs. The goal is to buy a minimum-cost set of
edges E(R) ⊂ (V2) such that these edges connect up each terminal pair in R. As in previous cases, we give
instructions in the form of a tree T = (V,ET ); each terminal pair (u, v) ∈ R takes the unique path PT (u, v)
in this tree T between themselves, and the (implicit) solution is the set of edges E(R) =
⋃
(u,v)∈R PT (u, v).
The tree T is given by the randomized construction of Fakcharoenphol et al. [FRT04], which guarantees
that E[cost(E(R))] ≤ O(log n) ·OPT; moreover, since the construction is oblivious to the set R, it preserves
the privacy of the terminal pairs perfectly (i.e., ǫ = 0). The same idea can be used for a variety of network
design problem (such as the “buy-at-bulk” problem) which can be solved by reducing it to a tree instance.
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10 Private Amplification Theorem
In this section, we show that differentially private mechanisms that give good guarantees in expectation can
be repeated privately to amplify the probability of a good outcome. First note that if we simply repeat a
private algorithm T times, and select the best outcome, we can get the following result:
Theorem 10.1. Let M : D → R be an ǫ-differentially private mechanism such that for a query function q,
and a parameter Q, Pr[q(A,M(A)) ≥ Q] ≥ 12 . Then for any δ > 0, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 12 ), there is a mechanism M ′
which satisfies the following properties:
• Utility: Pr[q(A,M(A)) ≥ Q] ≥ (1− 2−T ).
• Efficiency: M ′ makes T calls to M .
• Privacy: M ′ satisfies (ǫT )-differential privacy.
Note that the privacy parameter degrades linearly with T . Thus to bring down the failure probability to
inverse polynomial, one will have to make T logarithmic. To get ǫ′-differential privacy, one would then take
ǫ to be ǫ′/T . If Q was inversely proportional to ǫ, as is the case in many of our algorithms, this leads to an
additional logarithmic loss. The next theorem shows a more sophisticated amplification technique that does
better.
Theorem 10.2 (Private Amplification Theorem). Let M : D → R be an ǫ-differentially private mechanism
such that for a query function q with sensitivity 1, and a parameter Q, Pr[q(A,M(A)) ≥ Q] ≥ p for some
p ∈ (0, 1). Then for any δ > 0, ǫ′ ∈ (0, 12 ), there is a mechanism M ′ which satisfies the following properties:• Pr[q(A,M(A)) ≥ Q− 4ǫ′ log( 1ǫ′δp )] ≥ (1− δ).
• M ′ makes O(( 1ǫ′δp )2 log( 1ǫ′δp )) calls to M .
• M ′ satisfies (ǫ+ 8ǫ′)-differential privacy.
Proof. Let T = ( 8ǫ′δp )
2 log( 1ǫ′δp ). The mechanism M
′ runs M on the input A independently (T + 1) times
to get outputs S1 = {r1, . . . , rT+1}. It also adds in T ′ =
√
4T log T
ǫ′ dummy outcomes S2 = {s1, . . . , sT ′}
and selects an outcome from S1 ∪ S2 using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter ε′ and score
function
q˜(A, r) =
{
min(Q, q(A, r)) if r ∈ S1
Q if r ∈ S2
The efficiency of M ′ is immediate from the construction. To analyze the utility, note that (2.4) ensures
that the exponential mechanism’s output r satisfies q˜(A, r) > Q − 4ǫ′ log( 1ǫ′δp ) with probability (1 − δ2 ).
Conditioned on the output r satisfying this property, the ratio Pr[r ∈ S1]/Pr[r ∈ S2] is at least |{r ∈ S1 :
q(A, r) ≥ Q}|/|S2|. Since the numerator is at least pT in expectation, the probability of r being a dummy
outcome is at most δ2 . This establishes the utility property.
We now show the privacy property. For any r0 ∈ R,
Pr[M ′(A) = r0] =
T+1∑
i=1
Pr[ri = r0]E
[
exp(ǫ′q˜(A, r0))∑
r∈S1 exp(ǫ
′q˜(A, r)) + T ′ exp(ǫ′Q)
∣∣∣∣ ri = r0
]
= (T + 1) ·Pr[M(A) outputs r0] · exp(ǫ′q˜(A, r0)) · E
[
1∑
r∈S1 exp(ǫ
′q˜(A, r)) + T ′ exp(ǫ′Q)
∣∣∣∣ rT+1 = r0
]
= (T + 1) ·Pr[M(A) outputs r0] · exp(ǫ′q˜(A, r0)) · exp(−ǫ′Q)·
E
[
1∑
r∈S1\{r0} exp(ǫ
′(q˜(A, r) −Q)) + exp(ǫ′(q˜(A, r0)−Q)) + T ′
]
(10.9)
where the expectation is also taken over runs 1, . . . , T of M (we’ve explicitly conditioned on run (T + 1)
producing r0).
It is easy to bound the change in the first two terms when we change from input A to a neighboring input
B, since M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, and q˜ has sensitivity 1. Let D = D(A) denote the denominator in
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the final expectation; we would like to show that E[ 1D(A) ] ≤ exp(ǫ)E[ 1D(B) ] for neighboring inputs A and B.
Let C = exp(ǫ′(q˜(A, r0)−Q)) + T ′ denote the constant term in D(A).
First observe that
E[D(A)] = C + T · Er∈M(A)[exp(ǫ′(q˜(A, r) −Q)]
≥ C + T · exp(−ǫ′) · Er∈M(A)[exp(ǫ′(q˜(B, r) −Q)]
≥ C + T · exp(−2ǫ′) · Er∈M(B)[exp(ǫ′(q˜(B, r)−Q)]
≥ exp(−2ǫ′) · E[D(B)],
where the first inequality follows from the sensitivity of q and the second from the ǫ-differential privacy of
M . Thus E[D(A)] is close to E[D(B)]. We now show that E[ 1D(A) ] is close to
1
E[D(A)] for each A, which will
complete the proof.
The first step is to establish that D(A) is concentrated around its expectation. Since D = C +
∑T
i=1 Yi,
where the Yi’s are i.i.d. random variables in [0, 1], standard concentration bounds imply
Pr[D ≥ E[D] + t] ≤ exp(−2t2/T ); Pr[D ≤ E[D]− t] ≤ exp(−2t2/T );
Since 1D ≥ 1C , we can now estimate
E[
1
D
] ≤ exp(ǫ
′)
E[D]
+
∫ 1
C
exp(ǫ′)
E[D]
Pr[
1
D
≥ y]dy
≤ exp(ǫ
′)
E[D]
+
∫ exp(−ǫ′)E[D]
C
Pr[D ≤ z]
z2
dz
≤ exp(ǫ
′)
E[D]
+
1
C2
∫ exp(−ǫ′)E[D]
C
exp(−2(z − E[D])2/T )dz
≤ exp(ǫ
′)
E[D]
+
(exp(−ǫ′)E[D] − C)
C2
exp(−(ǫ′E[D])2/T )
≤ exp(ǫ
′)
E[D]
+
1
T 2
since E[D] > C >
√
4T log T
ǫ′ , E[D] < 2T , and C > 1. Thus E[
1
D ] ≤ exp(2ε
′)
E[D] .
Similarly,
E[
1
D
] ≥ exp(−ǫ
′)
E[D]
−
∫ exp(−ǫ′)
E[D]
0
Pr[
1
D
≤ y]dy
≥ exp(−ǫ
′)
E[D]
−
∫ ∞
exp(ǫ′)E[D]
Pr[D ≥ z]
z2
dz
≥ exp(−ǫ
′)
E[D]
− exp(−2ǫ
′)
E[D]2
∫ ∞
exp(ǫ′)E[D]
exp(−2(z − E[D])2/T )dz
≥ exp(−ǫ
′)
E[D]
− exp(−2ǫ
′)
E[D]2
√
T
≥ exp(−ǫ
′)
E[D]
− ǫ
′
E[D]
,
so that E[ 1D ] ≥ exp(−3ǫ
′)
E[D] .
Thus E[ 1D(A) ] ≤ exp(7ǫ′)E[ 1D(B) ] for neighboring inputs A and B. Now using this fact in expression (10.9)
for Pr[M ′(A) = r0] above, we conclude that M ′ satisfies (ǫ+ 8ǫ′)-differential privacy.
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A Unweighted Vertex Cover Algorithm: An Alternate View
In this section, we consider a slightly different way to implement the vertex cover algorithm. Given a
graph G = (V,E), we mimic the randomized proportional-to-degree algorithm for αn rounds (α < 1), and
output the remaining vertices in random order. That is, in each of the first αn rounds, we select the next
vertex i with probability proportional to d(i) + 1/ǫ: this is equivalent to imagining that each vertex has 1/ǫ
“hallucinated” edges in addition to its real edges. (It is most convenient to imagine the other endpoint of
these hallucinated edges as being fake vertices which are always ignored by the algorithm.)
When we select a vertex, we remove it from the graph, together with the real and hallucinated edges
adjacent to it. This is equivalent to picking a random (real or hallucinated) edge from the graph, and
outputting a random real endpoint. Outputting a vertex affects the real edges in the remaining graph, but
does not change the hallucinated edges incident to other vertices.
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Privacy Analysis. The privacy analysis is similar to that of Theorem 5.1: imagine the weights being
wi = 1/ǫ for the first αn rounds and wi = ∞ for the remaining rounds, which gives us 2
∑n
i=(1−α)n
1
iwi
≤
ǫ ( 2α1−α )-differential privacy.
Utility Analysis. To analyze the utility, we couple our algorithm with a run of the non-private algorithm
A that at each step picks an arbitrary edge of the graph and then picks a random endpoint: it is an easy
exercise that this an 2-approximation algorithm.
We refer to vertices that have non-zero “real” degree at the time they are selected by our algorithm as
interesting vertices : the cost of our algorithm is simply the number of interesting vertices it selects in the
course of its run. Let I1 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during the first αn steps, and
I2 denote the number of interesting vertices it selects during its remaining (1− α)n steps, when it is simply
ordering vertices randomly. Clearly, the total cost is I1 + I2.
We may view the first phase of our algorithm as selecting an edge at random (from among both real and
hallucinated ones) and then outputting one of its endpoints at random. Now, for the rounds in which our
algorithm selects a real edge, we can couple this selection with one step of an imagined run of A (selecting
the same edge and endpoint). Note that this run of A maintains a vertex cover that is a subset of our vertex
cover, and that once our algorithm has completed a vertex cover, no interesting vertices remain. Therefore,
while our algorithm continues to incur cost, A has not yet found a vertex cover.
In the first phase of our algorithm, every interesting vertex our algorithm selects has at least one real
edge adjacent to it, as well as 1/ǫ hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex, our
algorithm had selected a real edge with probability at least ǫ′ = 1/(1 + 1/ǫ). Let R denote the random
variable that represents the number of steps A is run for. E[R] ≤ 2OPT since A is a 2-approximation
algorithm. By linearity of expectation:
2OPT ≥ E[R] ≥ ǫ′ · E[I1] (A.10)
We now show that most of our algorithm’s cost comes from the first phase, and hence that I2 is not much
larger than I1.
Lemma A.1.
E[I1] ≥ ln
(
1
1− α
)
· E[I2]
Proof. Consider each of the αn steps of the first phase of our algorithm. Let ni denote the number of
interesting vertices remaining at step i. Note that {ni} is a non-increasing sequence. At step i, there are
ni interesting vertices and n− i + 1 remaining vertices. Note that the probability of picking an interesting
vertex is strictly greater than ni/(n− i+ 1) at each step. We may therefore bound the expected number of
interesting vertices picked in the first phase:
E[I1] >
αn∑
i=1
E[ni]
n− i+ 1 ≥ E[nαn]
n∑
j=(1−α)n
1
j
≥ ln
(
1
1− α
)
· E[nαn]
Noting that E[I2] ≤ E[nαn] completes the proof.
Combining the facts above, we get that
E[cost]
OPT
≤ 2
ǫ′
(
1 +
1
ln(1− α)−1
)
. (A.11)
B Missing Proofs
In this section, we prove Lemma 6.4. The lemma is a consequence of the following more general inequality.
Consider the following n round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a pi ∈ [0, 1]
possibly based on the first (i − 1) rounds and a coin is tossed with heads probability pi. Let Zi be the
indicator for the the event that no coin comes up heads in the first i steps. Let Yj denote the random
variable
∑n
i=j piZi and let Y = Y1.
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Lemma B.1. Let Y be defined as above. Then for any q, Pr[Y > q] ≤ exp(−q).
Proof. We claim that for any j and any q, Pr[Yj > q] ≤ exp(−q), which implies the lemma. The proof
is by reverse induction on j. For j = n, Yn is 0 if the nth coin or any coin before it comes up heads and
pn otherwise. Thus for q ≥ pn, the left hand side is zero. For q ∈ [0, pn), the left hand side is at most
(1− pn) ≤ exp(−pn) ≤ exp(−q). Finally, for q < 0 the right hand side exceeds 1.
Now suppose that for any adversary’s strategy and for all q, Pr[Yj+1 > q] ≤ exp(−q). We will show
the claim for Yj . Once again, for q ≤ 0, the claim is trivial. In round j, if the adversary chooses pj ,
there is a probability pj that the coin comes up heads so that Yj = 0. Thus for any q ≥ 0, Pr[Yj > q] =
Pr[pjZj + Yj+1 > q] = (1− pj)Pr[Yj+1 > q− pj]. Using the inequality (1− x) ≤ exp(−x) and the inductive
hypothesis, the claim follows for Yj .
To map the randomized algorithm to the setting of lemma B.1, we consider running the randomized
weighted set cover algorithm as follows. When choosing a set S in step i, the algorithm first tosses a
coin whose heads probability is pi(A) to decide whether to pick a set covering I or not. Then it uses a
second source of randomness to determine the set S itself, sampling from {S : I ∈ S} or {S : I 6∈ S} with the
appropriate conditional probabilities based on the outcome of the coin. Clearly this is a valid implementation
of the weighted set cover algorithm. Note that the probabilities pi(A) may depend on the actual sets chosen
in the first (i− 1) steps if none of the first (i− 1) coins come up heads. Since lemma B.1 applies even when
pi(A)’s are chosen adversarially, lemma 6.4 follows.
We also prove a more general version of Lemma B.1 that applies to non-Bernoulli distributions. This
lemma will be needed to prove the privacy of our algorithm for submodular minimization in Section 8. We
now consider a different n round probabilistic process. In each round, an adversary chooses a distribution
Di over [0, 1], possibly based on the first (i − 1) rounds and a sample Ri is drawn from the distribution Di.
Let Z0 = 1 and let Zi+1 = Zi − RiZi. Let Yj denote the random variable
∑n
j=1 ZiE[Ri] and let Y denote
Y1.
Lemma B.2. Let Y be defined as above. Then for any q, Pr[Y > q] ≤ e exp(−q).
Proof. We prove a stronger claim. We show that for Pr[Yj ≥ qZj ] ≤ e exp(−q). The proof is by reverse
induction on j. For j = n, Yn = E[Rn]Zn ≤ Zn since Dn is supported on [0, 1] and hence has expectation
at most 1. Thus the claim is trivial for any q ≥ 1. For q ≤ 1, the right hand side is at least 1 and there is
nothing to prove. Supppose that for any q and any strategy of the adversary, Pr[Yj+1 ≥ qZj+1] ≤ e exp(−q).
We show the claim for Yj . Once again the case q ≤ 1 is trivial, so we assume q ≥ 1. Let µj denote E[Rj ].
Note that Yj = Zjµj + Yj+1. Moreover, Zj+1 = (1−Rj)Zj . Thus,
Pr[Yj ≥ qZj] = ERj∈Dj [Pr[Yj+1 ≥ qZj−µjZj]] = ERj∈Dj [Pr[Yj+1 ≥
q − µj
1−Rj Zj+1]] ≤ ERj∈Dj [e exp(−
q − µj
1−Rj )].
We show that for any distribution D, the last term is bounded by e exp(−q), which will complete the proof.
Re-arranging, it suffices to show that for any distribution D on [0, 1],
ER∈D[exp(
µ− qR
1−R )] ≤ 1.
Since µ−qR1−R is positive when R ≤ µ/q and negative otherwise, one can verify that for any R, exp(µ−qR1−R ) ≤
exp(µ−qR1−µ
q
). Moreover, since exp(·) is convex, the function lies below the chord and we can conclude that
exp(µ−qR1−µ
q
) ≤ exp( µ1−µ
q
) +R(exp( µ−q1−µ
q
)− exp( µ1−µ
q
)). Thus it suffices to prove that
exp(
µ
1− µq
) + µ(exp(
µ− q
1− µq
)− exp( µ
1− µq
)) ≤ 1,
or equivalently
1 + µ(exp(
−q
1− µq
)− 1 ≤ exp( −µ
1− µq
).
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This rearranges to
1− exp(− µ
1− µq
) ≤ µ(1− exp(− q
1− µq
)).
Consider the function f(x) = 1−exp(− x1−µ
q
). f is convex with f(0) = 0 and f(1) ≤ f(q) = (1−exp(− q1−µ
q
)).
Thus f(µ) ≤ µf(1) ≤ µf(q), for q ≥ 1. The claim follows.
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